{"policy":"dispatch-eligibility","version":"2026-08-20","public_space":{"was":"Public spaces only.","is":"Public spaces only, unless the device's owner has granted otherwise — and every such grant is recorded against a named owner, on one device, and can be withdrawn.","why":"An owner permitting a stranger's agent to work on a machine in their home is making an informed, recorded, revocable decision about their own property. Forbidding it outright would be the platform overruling somebody about their own house; permitting it silently would be a promise quietly stopping being true. The record is what makes it answerable afterwards: who permitted this, on what device, and when."},"rules":[{"id":"human_provider","subject":"A phone held by a person who has filed a vetting record","stranger":"Yes, with no further permission — provided they have declared where they work, are actually near the mission, and are in good standing.","own":"Yes.","because":"The person is both the party consenting and the safeguard. They filed a legal name, an age assertion, contact details and a dated acceptance of terms; they are standing where the work is; and they can read a mission and decline it. That refusal is the last line of the safety model, and asking them to consent twice would add nothing."},{"id":"machine","subject":"A robot, a fixed camera, or a sensor","stranger":"Only with a `stranger_dispatch` grant from its owner — given per device, deliberately, and revocable at any time.","own":"Yes.","because":"A machine cannot look at a mission and decline it, so the safeguard a person provides is absent. The owner is the party who can consent, and they are consenting to something specific: that people they have never met may commission work on a machine that may be inside their home."},{"id":"undeclared","subject":"A device that has not said what it is","stranger":"Treated as a machine: a `stranger_dispatch` grant is required.","own":"Yes.","because":"Absence of a declaration is not a declaration. Reading an undeclared device as a person would grant it the benefit of a safeguard nobody has shown to exist, and the cost of being wrong falls on whoever is standing near it."},{"id":"live_steering","subject":"Driving a device in real time, rather than commissioning work","stranger":"A separate `stranger_live_steer` grant. Permission to commission work is NOT permission to steer.","own":"Yes.","because":"Commissioned work leaves the device's own safety loop in charge — it runs its own obstacle avoidance between every command. Live steering takes that away and puts a stranger's hand on the controls with nothing in between. An owner may reasonably allow the first and refuse the second, so one switch cannot express both."},{"id":"stranger_live_video","subject":"Watching a device's camera LIVE, as a stranger","stranger":"Yes, on a device that has DECLARED redaction for the live lane -- and only on one. Dispatch matches on the declaration, per device, and a device that has not declared is not offered the work at all.","own":"Yes, on your own devices, where you are the only viewer.","because":"Live media leaves the device in real time, so a stranger watching live sees whatever the device did not mask, as it happens. What stands between a bystander and that stream is the masking stage, so the rule gates on the thing that does the masking: a per-lane redaction declaration, absence of which reads as no. This rule has now been narrowed TWICE, and both narrowings are worth stating because each was once the whole reason. It first said the masking stage did not exist anywhere -- true when written, and no longer: a device declares the tags it applies and the frame rate it holds, for the live lane specifically. It then said a declaration on an unverifiable device was circular and required ATTESTATION as proof. That was withdrawn on 2026-08-22, because it was a bar nothing in the field could clear -- attestation is Apple's App Attest, so no robot could ever satisfy it, and the rule refused the entire non-Apple fleet for a proof they cannot produce. Attestation is now a FILTER an agent applies and a fact we disclose, not a permission we withhold. An owner may consent to a stranger using their machine; they cannot consent for whoever walks through the frame -- which is why the redaction declaration, and not the attestation level, is the conjunct that remains."},{"id":"stop","subject":"Stopping a device mid-mission","stranger":"Always permitted, on any active mission, with no grant of any kind.","own":"Always permitted.","because":"Refusing a stop is never the safer failure. Every other control can be gated; this one cannot."}],"grants":{"stranger_dispatch":"People you have never met can commission work on this device. Stringer will not screen where it goes -- you are the one saying it is safe to be there.","stranger_live_steer":"A stranger's agent can drive this device while a mission is running. Its own safety loop is no longer the thing deciding where it goes."},"grant_properties":["Given per device, never account-wide.","Given deliberately: no grant is created by registering, pairing, or claiming a device.","Recorded against the owner who gave it, with the moment they gave it.","Revocable at any time, and withdrawal is recorded rather than erased — so it stays possible to answer what was permitted, by whom, and when."],"device_side_limiter":"Independently of anything above, the device's own runtime refuses work its installation has not been configured to accept. That check is not removed by a grant — it is the layer that survives a mistake in ours."}