What leaves your device
Your phone does the looking. It turns what it sees into short structured notes — a bus, a sign reading "closed Saturday", eleven people in a queue — and sends those. It does not send the pictures.
What it will and will not read out depends on who asked. When your own agent asks, it is your camera doing what you told it. When a stranger's agent asks, somebody you have never met is on the other end, and the same frame means something different.
| What the camera saw | Your own agent asked | A stranger's agent asked |
|---|---|---|
| Vehicle plates, email addresses, postcodes, national insurance numbers and phone numbers appearing in read text These identify people who are not party to the mission and did not agree to it. Who commissioned the work makes no difference to them, so it makes no difference here. | masked out | masked out |
| Personal names appearing in read text Same reason: a name on a nameplate or a delivery label belongs to somebody who is not in this transaction. | masked out | masked out |
| Text fragments that individually look harmless but recombine into a plate or number Optical character recognition returns regions separately and out of order. A rule that only inspected one region at a time would miss a plate split across two. | masked out | masked out |
| Text read from something the device recognises as a document or printed page — a letter, a form, an appointment card This is the one thing that turns on who asked. Reading your own post back to your own agent is a thing you asked for. Reading it to a stranger's agent is a disclosure you did not, and it is the category — health, finance, legal — where being wrong costs the most. The device already recognises a document in the same frame as the text, so this is enforced where the frame is, before anything is sent or encrypted. | sent to the agent | not sent |
If we cannot tell which it is
stranger — if the relationship cannot be established, the stricter policy applies. We would rather lose a line of text off your own desk than read your post to somebody else.
Why documents are the line
A letter, a form or an appointment card is the one thing a camera can read that is about you rather than about the place you are standing in. There is no way to edit that safely — take the reference number out of a hospital letter and it is still a hospital letter — so for a stranger's mission the device does not read it at all. It recognises the document in the same moment it reads the text, before anything is sent.
For machines
The same policy, as JSON, is at
/v0/policy/observation. It is
versioned; this is 2026-08-19. The page you are reading and
that document are generated from one source, so they cannot disagree.
Who can be sent to your device
That is a different question from what leaves it, and the answer stopped being the same for everybody on 2026-08-20.
It used to be: Public spaces only.
It is now: Public spaces only, unless the device's owner has granted otherwise — and every such grant is recorded against a named owner, on one device, and can be withdrawn.
An owner permitting a stranger's agent to work on a machine in their home is making an informed, recorded, revocable decision about their own property. Forbidding it outright would be the platform overruling somebody about their own house; permitting it silently would be a promise quietly stopping being true. The record is what makes it answerable afterwards: who permitted this, on what device, and when.
| What it is | Your own agents | A stranger’s agent |
|---|---|---|
| A phone held by a person who has filed a vetting record The person is both the party consenting and the safeguard. They filed a legal name, an age assertion, contact details and a dated acceptance of terms; they are standing where the work is; and they can read a mission and decline it. That refusal is the last line of the safety model, and asking them to consent twice would add nothing. | Yes. | Yes, with no further permission — provided they have declared where they work, are actually near the mission, and are in good standing. |
| A robot, a fixed camera, or a sensor A machine cannot look at a mission and decline it, so the safeguard a person provides is absent. The owner is the party who can consent, and they are consenting to something specific: that people they have never met may commission work on a machine that may be inside their home. | Yes. | Only with a `stranger_dispatch` grant from its owner — given per device, deliberately, and revocable at any time. |
| A device that has not said what it is Absence of a declaration is not a declaration. Reading an undeclared device as a person would grant it the benefit of a safeguard nobody has shown to exist, and the cost of being wrong falls on whoever is standing near it. | Yes. | Treated as a machine: a `stranger_dispatch` grant is required. |
| Driving a device in real time, rather than commissioning work Commissioned work leaves the device's own safety loop in charge — it runs its own obstacle avoidance between every command. Live steering takes that away and puts a stranger's hand on the controls with nothing in between. An owner may reasonably allow the first and refuse the second, so one switch cannot express both. | Yes. | A separate `stranger_live_steer` grant. Permission to commission work is NOT permission to steer. |
| Watching a device's camera LIVE, as a stranger Live media leaves the device in real time, so a stranger watching live sees whatever the device did not mask, as it happens. What stands between a bystander and that stream is the masking stage, so the rule gates on the thing that does the masking: a per-lane redaction declaration, absence of which reads as no. This rule has now been narrowed TWICE, and both narrowings are worth stating because each was once the whole reason. It first said the masking stage did not exist anywhere -- true when written, and no longer: a device declares the tags it applies and the frame rate it holds, for the live lane specifically. It then said a declaration on an unverifiable device was circular and required ATTESTATION as proof. That was withdrawn on 2026-08-22, because it was a bar nothing in the field could clear -- attestation is Apple's App Attest, so no robot could ever satisfy it, and the rule refused the entire non-Apple fleet for a proof they cannot produce. Attestation is now a FILTER an agent applies and a fact we disclose, not a permission we withhold. An owner may consent to a stranger using their machine; they cannot consent for whoever walks through the frame -- which is why the redaction declaration, and not the attestation level, is the conjunct that remains. | Yes, on your own devices, where you are the only viewer. | Yes, on a device that has DECLARED redaction for the live lane -- and only on one. Dispatch matches on the declaration, per device, and a device that has not declared is not offered the work at all. |
| Stopping a device mid-mission Refusing a stop is never the safer failure. Every other control can be gated; this one cannot. | Always permitted. | Always permitted, on any active mission, with no grant of any kind. |
What a permission is
- Given per device, never account-wide.
- Given deliberately: no grant is created by registering, pairing, or claiming a device.
- Recorded against the owner who gave it, with the moment they gave it.
- Revocable at any time, and withdrawal is recorded rather than erased — so it stays possible to answer what was permitted, by whom, and when.
These are the exact words shown to an owner at the moment they allow it:
- People you have never met can commission work on this device. Stringer will not screen where it goes -- you are the one saying it is safe to be there.
- A stranger's agent can drive this device while a mission is running. Its own safety loop is no longer the thing deciding where it goes.
And the device’s own refusal
Independently of anything above, the device's own runtime refuses work its installation has not been configured to accept. That check is not removed by a grant — it is the layer that survives a mistake in ours.
For machines
This half, as JSON, is at
/v0/policy/dispatch, versioned
2026-08-20 and generated from the same source as the
words above.